Abstract
A growing literature argues that, in the period since independence, Sub-Saharan Africa's urbanization process has differed fundamentally from the rest of the developing world.
2 This complements a large literature arguing that many economic processes in Africa are different (e.g., Binswanger and Townsend 2000 , Collier and Venables 2007 , Ostry, and Subramanian 2007 Acemoglu and Robinson 2010; Block and Bates 2011) . The urbanization literature suggests that two stylized facts that hold for the rest of the world do not hold for Africa. First, while rapid urbanization in other developing regions has been accompanied by fast macroeconomic growth, Africa has seen urbanization without growth (e.g., World Bank 1999 Bank , 2009 Fay and Opal 2000; Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl 2010; Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath 2012) .
Second, while, in the rest of the world, urbanization has generally been accompanied by a sector transformation from agriculture to manufacturing, Africa is urbanizing without industrialization (e.g., Fay and Opal 2000; Collier and Venables 2007; Gollin et al. 2012 ).
3
Empirical evaluation of both stylized facts is complicated by low quality data for Africa and by the difficulty of identifying causality. Jedwab (2012) makes progress on the sector transformation question using a case study, showing empirically that arguably exogenous positive shocks to agriculture spur local urbanization in newly cultivated areas. The work is focused on synergies between cities and their immediate hinterlands, not on how positive shocks to agriculture affect national urbanization. Related theoretical work by Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath (2012) argues that positive shocks to agriculture will spur national development of a non-traded good and service sector in urban areas, to the detriment of the traded industrial sector in cities. They argue that African cities are primarily "consumer cities" that arise to fulfill increased demand for non-traded, non-agricultural goods, where increased demand is based on increased agricultural and natural resource export rents.
This paper makes two types of innovations to this literature. First, we find different results on both the overall urbanization process and on the effects of sectoral shocks on urbanization.
Second, we focus on estimation of causal relationships. On the general urbanization process, African urbanization follows fundamental growth drivers in the same way as the rest of the 2 For brevity, in the remainder of this paper we frequently refer to Sub-Saharan Africa as either SSA or simply
Africa. Similarly, we often refer to the rest of the developing world as just the "rest of the world" or NSSA (nonSub-Saharan Africa). 3 Explanations for this lack of industrialization include small country sizes restricting specialization, crowd-out by primary exports, exchange rate overvaluation, high labor costs relative to quality, poor infrastructure, and inadequate institutions (e.g., Johnson et al., 2007 , Collier and Venables 2007 , Barrios et al., 2010 .
world. Long term income growth and changes in urbanization are not significantly correlated inside or outside of Africa, although this may be due in part to substantial measurement error in GDP data (Henderson, Storeygard and Weil 2012; Young 2012) . More fundamentally, even if we found a positive correlation between changes in urbanization and in accurately measured income, this relationship should not be seen as a causal one. Rather, a country's urbanization and income growth should be viewed as equilibrium outcomes of allocations across sectors which are influenced by capital accumulation and technological sophistication, as well as trade relationships and resource availability. Thus, models of urbanization set in endogenous growth frameworks feature human capital accumulation as the driver of technological progress, leading to productivity growth in both the urban and rural sectors, as well as a shift of labor from the rural (or traditional) sector to the urban (or modern) sector (Galor and Zeira 1993; Lucas 2004; Henderson and Wang 2005; Galor, Moav and Vollrath 2009) . Consistent with this, we find that urbanization responds to human capital accumulation in Africa as it does in the rest of the world.
With respect to sector development, simple two sector models in which agriculture is rural and manufacturing is urban suggest that positive shocks to agriculture should deter urbanization by raising rural sector incomes. Unlike Gollin et al (2012) , we find empirically that positive shocks to agriculture do deter urbanization in Africa. However we find the opposite in the rest of the developing world. While simple two sector models are consistent with African urbanization, they are not consistent with experiences in the rest of the world. Why? In certain contexts, positive agricultural shocks may not be passed through to farm workers. First, institutionally imposed monopsony purchasing of agricultural products (Jayne and Jones 1997) and collection by the government of agricultural surpluses may mean agricultural surpluses are distributed to urban dwellers, not farmers, as highlighted in the urban bias literature (Renaud 1980; Henderson 1988; Ades and Glaeser 1995; Davis and Henderson 2003; McCormick and Wahba 2003) .
Second, agricultural surpluses may accrue more to landowners who invest surpluses in capital for "urban activities" in a Galor and Zeira (1992) over-lapping generations framework. Finally, as suggested in Gollin et al. (2012) , even if farmers get more income they may spend it on nontraded goods produced in cities, as opposed to traded manufactures. It is clear there are considerations beyond the simple two sector model which could lead positive agriculture shocks to promote urbanization. Whether or not they do is an empirical question.
Another way to tackle the relationship between structural transformation and urbanization is to look at shocks to the industrial sector rather than agriculture. Urbanization in developing countries outside Africa responds positively to trade shocks in the "modern manufacturing" subsector. 4 The presence of such a response, and its absence in other sub-sectors of manufacturing, is consistent with the existence of strong urban scale effects in this sub-sector (Henderson, Lee and Lee 2001) . For Africa, however, we observe no response of urbanization to trade shocks for all industrial sub-sectors, including the modern manufacturing sub-sector. However the African lack of response has a potential explanation. The evidence shows that the response to modern manufacturing shocks is strongly increasing in a country's level of development, or human capital; and, on average, African countries have lower levels of human capital than do other developing countries.
In empirically analyzing sector responses, our econometric challenge is to move away from correlations in the data to identify causal effects. Sector composition and urbanization are simultaneous outcomes influenced by many factors we do not observe. Our innovation is to have effective randomization: we estimate the urbanization response of developing countries to external trade shocks, given historical trade patterns. For agriculture, we have detailed historical export data differentiated by crop type. We use changes in current world commodity prices to shock the agricultural sector of each developing country, using the historical export data to weight crop prices for each exporter. For the industrial sector, we model shocks to the demand for a developing country's exports using OECD country income variation. For each developing country, we know historical bilateral trade-patterns to OECD countries, indicating historical pathways or networks of trade flow destinations by country. We use these to weight the exogenous shocks (changes in OECD country incomes). In both cases we are following a strategy akin to Card (2001) . Using import data from OECD and other more developed countries has the added advantage that it is more likely to be reliable than developing country sector composition data.
As a final topic in the paper, we look at the effect of political institutions on urbanization, linking to the literature on whether political institutions account for Africa's poor growth performance. One strand of this literature emphasizes the long run effects of pre-colonial institutions on their modern counterparts. Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) , for example, argue that governance in many African countries is "neopaternalistic" with the ruler standing above the law in his ability to expropriate and confer rights. Weak institutions perpetuate appropriation risk and bureaucratic rent seeking, thereby lowering private citizens' incentives for saving and investment, as well as governments' incentives to supply public goods, which are important for both agricultural and industrial development (Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian 2007; Binswanger and Townsend 2000; Block and Bates 2011) . 5 However, while weak institutions may inhibit development, we seek to address a different question: do they have any further effect on urbanization, conditional on the degree of development? One hypothesis is that countries with weak underlying determinants of institutions may find it harder to upgrade from the informal institutions that tend to prevail in rural societies to the more formal, structured institutions that are characteristic of urban settings. As such, these countries may be less likely to urbanize.
In addressing the relationship between political institutions and urbanization we are confronted with the well-known problem of the endogeneity of contemporaneous institutions.
To deal with this problem we focus on time invariant and pre-determined country conditions thought to independently influence the development of institutions, such as a long history of statehood or less ethno-linguistic fractionalization, to see, first of all, if these have any effect and, if so, whether this effect differs between Africa and the rest of the world.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section, Section 1, presents basic correlations which help to set the scene and motivate the subsequent analysis. Section 2 then provides a model of structural change and urbanization. Section 3 presents our econometric specification which derives from this model, as well as our basic results which follow from the estimation of this specification. Section 4 considers the impact of pseudo-random trade shocks on urbanization, while Section 5 examines the relationship between institutions and urbanization.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
5 Binswanger and Townsend (2000) argue that monopolistic dominance in the purchase of output and inputs (seeds and fertilizer) by government or private concerns, low functioning and biased capital markets, heavy taxation of farm output, and lack of political voice of farmers (who are often disproportionately women) reduce incentives in, and, therefore, also the performance of, agriculture. Block and Bates (2011) argue that TFP in African agriculture is low, with a decline in capital investment and use of fertilizer between 1985 and 2007 due to poor incentives. Using World Bank enterprise surveys for 10 African countries, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sorensen (2012) argue that access to capital markets is restricted and capital is misallocated compared to other regions of the world. In their limited sample, African countries with better institutions, property rights and legal systems have better allocations in capital markets.
Patterns in the data
For this paper, the sample is all countries that, in 1970, had a population in excess of 300,000
and a level of GDP per capita that was less than the world sample mean for all countries meeting the population criterion. 6 With an average level of GDP per capita of $1,877 in 2009, SubSaharan African (SSA) countries in the sample are much poorer on average than countries in the rest of the developing world (non-SSA, or NSSA), where the average is $6,235 (Table 1 ). Our results are generally similar for both samples. We prefer the larger sample because it provides more power. We try to address this limited overlap between the two samples in other ways. Data sources and definitions, as well as a complete list of sample countries, are provided in Appendix 1.
What associations are there in the data? Figure 1a and Table 2 (column 1) show that the association between GDP per capita and urbanization levels that is present in much of the world is absent in Africa in 2010, as suggested in the literature (Fay and Opal 2000 , Barrios et al. 2006 , Collier and Venables 2007 . However, two additional facts make us wary of drawing any conclusions from correlations between income and urbanization levels. First, for the period 1970-2010, there is no evidence of a significant long difference relationship between changes in GDP per capita and in urbanization, and this is true for both Africa and the rest of the world (Figure 2a and Table 3 , cols 1 and 2). Second as noted earlier, GDP data are particularly suspect in Africa (Young 2012 , Henderson et al. 2012 . As such, these associations are measured with a high degree of error that may differ substantially across regions. Figure 1b and Table 2 (col. 3), we see that the relationship between urbanization and the average years of high school and college per adult for Africa is virtually identical to that for the rest of the world. Similarly, in Figure 2b (see also Next we turn to sector differences. As noted above, Africa is less industrialized than the rest of the developing world and also has a higher share of GDP in agriculture -23% for SSA compared to 14% elsewhere in 2010 (Table 1) . The puzzle, which has been highlighted in the literature (e.g., Fay and Opal 2000; Collier and Venables 2007; Gollin et al. 2012) , is that the distinct cross-section relationship between higher urbanization and lower agricultural share (higher manufacturing share) that exists elsewhere in the world is not present in Africa ( Figure   3a and Table 4 , cols 1 and 2). Figure 3b shows a negative long difference relationship between agricultural growth and urbanization in the rest of the developing world, but no relationship for Africa. However, the differenced relationships are all insignificant (Table 4 , cols 3 and 4), although sample sizes are small. While we are concerned about the quality of African GDP data, we are even more concerned about the accuracy of the sector shares. Hence our econometric analysis will rely on trade data collected by more developed countries.
Conceptualizing urbanization
are better than other sources of data, reporting past urbanization fairly reliably, even if projections are questionable. We return to this issue later. 9 We also obtain very similar results when we use average years of schooling at levels other than high school and college as our measure of educational attainment.
In thinking about urbanization in developing countries, researchers have traditionally been guided by classic two-sector models of rural-urban migration (Harris and Todaro 1969; Williamson 1986; Mills and Becker 1986) . Implicit in these models is the presumption that economic development involves a transition of employment from a backward rural sector to a modern urban manufacturing sector. 10 More recently, growth models of urbanization have endogenized the employment transition, modeling the switch from a rural or backward sector to an urban or modern sector as human capital accumulates. In Henderson and Wang (2005) this involves a shift from rural production to the production of urban goods. In other models, however, there is no shift per se in the good produced. Rather, the transition is from a sector in which production relies on land and unskilled labor to a sector which produces the same good, but instead using skilled labor (e.g., Lucas 2004 , Caselli and Coleman 2001 , Galor and Zeira 1993 and, in some cases, also physical capital (Galor et al. 2009 ). We do not repeat these models here. Rather, we simply adopt the presumption that the urbanization process is driven by human capital accumulation. Given this presumption, we explicitly consider the impact on this process of trade conditions and shocks, which affect the price of agricultural and natural resource products, relative to manufacturing goods (i.e. the terms of trade).
We start with a two sector model of rural-urban migration, assuming a small open economy with both rural agriculture and urban manufacturing production. As is typical, missing from the specification are non-traded locally produced goods within both the urban and rural sectors. In most developing countries, significant portions of rural employment is in non-agricultural, mostly non-export production, including locally manufactured and consumed food products, cooking utensils, furniture, apparel, and trunks, as well as housing and retail services. For example, the three lower income SSA countries with IPUMS data from the last 10 years, Malawi The general point is that, in the data, "rural" is not just agriculture and "urban" is not just modern manufacturing; and modeling ignores this fact.
10 This is consistent with the common portrayal of cities as "engines of growth" (see, for e.g., World Bank 1999 . 11 However if all such non-agricultural goods are defined to be produced only in the urban sector (and exported domestically to the agricultural sector) as in Gollin et al (2012) , then one can get fundamentally different results.
To facilitate a focus on rural-urban transitions in the classic two sector model, we embed this in an endogenous growth model of urbanization based on Henderson and Wang (2005) . 12 Within this framework, human capital accumulation fuels urbanization under a fairly straightforward set of conditions, which we note later. We focus on how urbanization is influenced by both the terms of trade and national population growth.
In the rural sector per person production and income is given by
where a I is per person rural income. The RHS of (1) 
where N is the urban population.
Although in Henderson and Wang (2005) there is a system of cities, the urban sector could be conceived of as a single city 13 where there are external scale economies in production that generate initial benefits to having a larger city, but there are also diseconomies in terms of potential work time that is lost in commuting, which increase as city population and spatial area rise. In such models there is a residential sector spatial equilibrium with land rents and commuting distances, but these models all end up with a reduced form expression for per person urban real income, u I , 12 Henderson and Wang's model is itself adapted from Black and Henderson (1999) , with a sophisticated version in Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2008) that adds in a stochastic process, multiple rather than just two sectors, and physical as well as human capital accumulation. 13 Total urban population is, therefore, given by the population of this city. Here, as the urban population expands relative to rural, for stability we need to assume that the rate of growth of urban incomes is less than that of rural incomes. A specific example from Duranton and Puga (2004) gives the form (1) with (3) we have
Our estimating equation will be based on a differenced version of (4). We define:
M is positive in a stable allocation between the urban and rural sectors. That is, as the urban sector expands, the rise in productivity in the rural sector from an increased land-labor ratio,
, exceeds that in the urban sector. In our estimating equation we look at the change in the urban share over time or ( / ) d N N . Differencing (4) and rearranging into the estimating form for a LHS of ( / ) d N N we have 14 Or, using the functional forms mentioned above,
dN dN > the effect on the urban share, / N N , of an increase in national population is ambiguous. Everything else is straightforward. An increase in the relative price of the agricultural good decreases urbanization, because the enhanced returns to agriculture draw people out of the urban sector. An increase in land reduces urban population and share as agriculture becomes more productive. For human capital, as in growth models of the urbanization process, we generally assume
with fixed terms of trade, human capital growth leads to increased urbanization, given the relative gain in labor productivity in the urban versus rural sector. Given its non-linearities, this model does not, in the closed economy case, lend itself to simple closed form solutions (see Henderson and Wang, 2005) . As explained in Appendix 2, for the specific functional forms we use here for a small open economy, we simply assume that there is eventual convergence to an approximate steady-state and that developing countries are still accumulating human capital. In general, urban human capital levels exceed rural, because the return to human capital is higher in the urban sector. Growth rates of human capital in the two sectors may, however, be the same.
Our empirical results for Africa will conform to the results in equation (6). In particular, we find that positive shocks to African agriculture reduce the urban share, but this is not the case for non-African countries. Given the predictions of our simple model, what might explain this result in non-African countries? We consider two additional features noted earlier that might lead to this result: (1) monopsony purchasing by state boards and (2) a class of landowners that invests agricultural profits in cities.
Monopsony purchasing in agriculture
A government purchasing board that exercises monopsony rights to agricultural products fixes prices paid to farmers at below market prices, a p , selling at an international price in excess of a p and distributing surplus rents. In this context, the impact on urbanization of a positive shock to agricultural prices will depend on who receives the additional surplus. In particular, if the additional surplus is distributed to the representative urban resident, then the urbanization response will be positive. However, if the additional surplus is instead distributed only to elites, there will be no urbanization response because, in these circumstances, the shock will not change the margin of choice for the representative rural-urban migrant.
15
To see this more clearly, consider an example. The income to a rural resident is now given
. Since rural and urban incomes are equal, national demand for domestically consumed agricultural output can be written as (
, where for simplicity we assume all domestic consumers pay a p . The volume of agricultural exports is then
. If this surplus is divided equally among urban residents we now have a new urban-rural migration equilibrium condition:
Given the stability requirement that
is straightforward to show that
The problem with this explanation for the positive response of non-African urbanization to agricultural price shocks is that monopsony purchasing boards have historically been seen as more prevalent in Africa than elsewhere (Jayne and Jones 1997 , Binswanger and Townsend 2000 , Block and Bates 2011 . Given this, we turn to a second potential explanation based on another important difference between Africa and the rest of the world.
Private ownership of land
Our model treats rural land as communally owned, and this does fit Africa better than it does the rest of the developing world. How would private ownership change the comparative statics? To consider this question, suppose there is a class of landowners, distinct from workers, as featured in overlapping generations growth models such as Galor and Zeira (1993) and Galor et al. (2009) . Consider a small open economy with sectors producing an agricultural good, a modern manufactured good, and a "traditional" manufactured good (e.g., furniture, food utensils, and apparel) which is produced in the rural, as well as potentially the urban, sector. In a set-up like this, increased export demand for either agriculture or modern manufacturing can promote urbanization. 16 To see this, suppose agriculture is produced with land and unskilled labor, modern manufacturing with physical and human capital, and traditional manufacturing with unskilled labor. Land is owned by a class of landowner dynasties, in which parents have the knowledge and skills to invest their bequests in physical capital in the urban sector, but rural unskilled labors have neither the mechanisms nor information to undertake such investments.
In this context, an increase in the international price of agriculture has two effects. First, it raises the marginal product of unskilled labor in farming, deterring urbanization. The second effect is to raise the return to land and bequests of landowners. This raises their investment in physical capital, which raises the marginal product of efficiency units of labor in the urban sector. Depending on the magnitude of the first effect relative to the second, the wages in agriculture relative to manufacturing may rise or fall and urbanization may be deterred or spurred.
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In many developing countries outside of Africa, agricultural land has been privately owned for at least the last 150 years. Landowners have invested agricultural surpluses in physical capital. Sugar cane plantation owners in Brazil, for example, progressed from food processing to modern light manufacturing (Baer 1979) . In the vast majority of African countries, by contrast, rural land is communally owned (Bruce 1998) . Such land may be allocated by a village head, with use and, perhaps, control rights. However, if such allocations do not include transfer rights they cannot be used as collateral. And, in general, direct collection of land rental income is rare.
In essence, there therefore exists some large class of unskilled farmers with small holdings who earn their average product. This difference in landownership could explain some of the difference in the effect of agricultural price shocks on urbanization in Africa versus the rest of the developing world.
Econometric specification and base results
The econometric specification is based on equation (6). The base specification examines changes in the urban share as a function of two variables: 1) the national population growth rate and 2) the growth rate in the average years of post-primary (i.e. high school and college) education in the adult population (over age 25), which represents both changes in effective labor units and 
In this specification, the unit of analysis is first-differences at 10 year intervals, as denoted by 10 ∆ . We pool 4 time periods : 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000, and 2000-10. are changes in the urban share, human capital (and, hence, effective technology), and national population, respectively. We include time dummies (T t ) to account for global changes in, for example, the world technology level to which all developing countries are adapting. The X term in different specifications includes factors that shock income such as commodity price indices, trade partner income indices, rainfall, and institutional influences. When these are time varying, we generally lag the differences by 2 or 5 years to allow the shocks time to have an impact. We also sometimes smooth measures such as prices and rainfall to reduce noise and give more weight to more persistent shocks. Finally, we cluster errors by country to account for possible country-specific serial correlation (Stock and Watson, 2008) .
Identification
The chief estimation concern is identification. Everything is potentially endogenous and while we can estimate correlations, claiming causality is a challenge. We address this problem in two ways. First, we consider correlations among country conditions and spell out the assumptions required for effects to be causal in our base case. Second, in later sections, we construct plausibly exogenous shocks to gain pseudo-randomization.
What do we need for identification of the base specification? Let's start with national population growth. Consider a time-varying unobservable such as the urban-rural differential in quality of health care. If such an amenity enters the utility function separably, the effect of differences in relative quality levels is differenced out in the growth specification. But relative differences are likely to change over time. Suppose that over the decade 10 t − to t , urban health care improves both absolutely and relative to rural health care. This improvement could draw more rural migrants to cities thus having an unobserved direct effect on urbanization. But it could also reduce national population growth, if better access to health facilities increases the provision and social acceptance of birth control in urban areas, reducing birth rates aged 5-30 over the decade in cities and therefore also nationally. If both links exist, our estimated effect of population growth on urbanization will be understated. Of course better relative improvements in health care in cities could also reduce national death rates with an opposite bias.
Education presents a related endogeneity concern. Relative improvements in urban education facilities in a decade may cause both a move to cities and directly enhance national educational achievement. Here, however, timing may alleviate the problem, making it less salient. We consider educational attainment of the population age 25 or older. The change in this variable between t and 10 t − includes information only about people who were aged at least 15 in 10 t − .
It may be reasonable to assume that decisions about their educational progress were effectively made before contemporaneous changes in relative urban-rural education quality. However, if changes in rural-urban educational quality differentials are correlated across decades, then the problem remains.
We first present results using this base specification. Then we turn to trade shocks to the modern sector, rain and price shocks to the agricultural sector and the role of institutions. Table 5 presents results from the estimation of our base specification. In column 1, urbanization is positively and significantly affected by both the growth of national population and the growth of effective technology. In column 2, we estimate the same relationship as in column 1 for a restricted sample in order to reduce concerns about extrapolation in the UN projections (Potts 2012 ). Specifically, we limit to country-years no more than 5 years after the most recent census.
Base results
Results are very similar. In column 3, using the original sample, we add interactions with an SSA dummy for all variables (including time dummies) and report its effect on slope coefficients.
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The SSA differential is not significant for growth in national population or in effective technology, individually or jointly. The point estimates are not small, but small sample sizes limit precision. If anything, changes in effective technology have stronger effects in SSA. 20 If we use alternative measures of education, such as the fraction of the population over 25 with at least some secondary schooling, we get similar results.
In column 4, we add land area and land area interacted with national population growth to account for changes in density. As might be expected, the effect of population growth on urbanization is more modest in countries with larger areas and thus more farm land on average.
We keep these additional variables in our base specification for the rest of the paper. 21 Finally, in column 5, we find no compelling SSA differentials in the column 4 specification.
How big are these effects? In column 4, for a country of average ln(land area), a one standard deviation change in the national population growth rate leads to a 0.57 percentage point increase in the percentage of the population classified as urban. For a country with one standard deviation more land, the impact of a one standard deviation change in population growth on the urban share drops to 0.043. A one standard increase in the growth of education (0.30 years) leads to a 1.05 percentage point increase in the growth of urban share (equivalent to 0.28 standard deviations of growth in urban share). The average change in urban share per decade in the 19 Whenever we introduce SSA differences in a specification in the paper we always interact all covariate coefficients including time dummies. We only, however, report the interactions for the current variables of interest. Although interacting all covariates reduces precision, it also reduces the risk that we are misinterpreting other interaction effects as our effect of interest. 20 If we measure change in effective technology using growth in GDP per capita, we get similar, but weaker results.
Explanatory power falls and the ∆ 10 lnGDPpc coefficient is insignificant at the 5% level. The ∆ 10 lnGDPpc coefficient (s.e.) and the coefficient on ∆ 10 lnGDPpc interacted with SSA are respectively 2.858 (1.455) and -0.705 (1.960). The GDP per capita relationships subject to the measurement problems with GDP discussed above. 21 We also interacted education with land area. The interaction term is positive but insignificant, and the education effect at mean size is the same as in column 4. The coefficient (s.e.) is 0.453 (0.688).
sample is 4.67, so our results suggest that a standard deviation increase in education growth would raise this to about 5.7.
As we discussed above, both population growth and education are potentially endogenous.
However, an instrumental variables strategy poses two major problems. First, we are unable to independently predict both population growth and education growth. Possible instruments include lagged ( 20) t − population shares of both youths (aged 0-15) and the elderly (over 65), and sex-specific lagged education measures. These generally predict growth in both population and education, and the joint Kleibergen-Papp F-statistic is, at best, between 3 and 4. The second problem is that these variables are unlikely to meet the exclusion restriction, since all may affect contemporaneous migration decisions.
Trade shocks to agriculture and manufacturing
In this section we examine the effect of exogenous trade shocks on urbanization, with an emphasis on how Africa might respond differently to these economic forces. We start with trade shocks to agriculture and also natural resources.
Shocks to agriculture and natural resources
Our main focus is on shocks to agriculture overall. In the last part of the section, we distinguish between food and non-food agriculture, and we consider price shocks to non-agricultural natural resources.
Agriculture
We examine two kinds of agricultural shocks: rainfall and international agricultural prices. Our rainfall measure is based on an annual average aggregated for each country from interpolated gauge data. For price shocks we use an index suggested in Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) and Collier and Goderis (2009) . Each country is a long term exporter of a specific set of agricultural commodities such as coffee and cocoa, with their individual export bundles depending primarily on physical geographic factors. As world prices fluctuate for these primary products, so do potential incomes of exporting countries. Equation (6) suggests that increased agricultural product prices will expand agricultural employment and slow national urbanization. However, as equation (8) suggests, if the surplus generated in agriculture does not go to farmers, but is spent instead in cities, then higher prices will instead fuel urbanization. Results are reported in Table 6 . We show the price and rainfall shocks together. Coefficients on each are robust to the inclusion of the other. If African weather conditions are affecting world prices for any product then by including both we are separating out the effects. In column 1, 22 These goods are listed in the data appendix. 23 In an attempt to expand the sample we also experimented with the use of weights based on 1970-72 data in the definition of the price environment. GDP data are available for a greater number of countries in this period. The results we obtained were similar to those reported. However, since 1970-72 falls within our sample-period, our preferred results are those based on the 1962-69 weights. 24 We also report results with a 2 year lag. 25 If fewer than 3 years of data are available for a particular year-variable we smooth over the number of years that are available.
rainfall has a negative effect, consistent with the story that rainfall improves agricultural productivity (effective land, in terms of our theoretical model), raising incomes in agriculture and deterring urbanization. Consistent with Barrios et al (2006) , the estimated coefficient on the SSA interaction with rainfall in column 2 is negative, implying that the negative effect of rainfall on urbanization is larger in Africa than in the rest of the world. However, unlike Barrios et al, we
do not find this differential to be significant. We were surprised by the weakness of our results in this area.
Our main results concern agricultural price shocks. In column 1 for the overall sample, there is a positive but insignificant price shock effect. Column 2 indicates a strong and highly significant positive effect of 9 on urbanization for non-SSA countries; and a strong net negative significant effect of about -7.6 for SSA countries. 26 For the rest of the world, a one standard deviation increase in the price shock variable (0.046) leads to 0.41 increase in the urban share, where the average increase is 4.74. In SSA, such a price increase leads to a 0.35 decline in the urban share. To consider the possibility that our results are driven by outliers, we iteratively dropped individual observations whose absence had a noticeable impact on the coefficients of interest (the price shock variable and the SSA differential for that variable). Doing so only strengthened the effects. 27 In column 3, we show weaker results with a 2-year lag structure.
Why do results differ for African versus non-African countries? No data that is consistently available across countries quantifies the phenomenon of capturing agricultural rents and spending them in cities or not. We consider government consumption as a share of GDP as a crude proxy. A regression of changes in government consumption on our base covariates, agricultural price shocks, and all SSA interactions yields a coefficient (s.e) on the agricultural price shock variable of 0.125 (.0657) and the SSA interaction of -0.234 (0.219). This is modest support for the idea that surpluses fund increased government procurement of actual goods and services delivered in cities outside of Africa, with no such reaction in Africa, but differential data quality may again be driving this difference.
In section 2.2, we also speculated that land ownership systems might drive differentials between SSA and non-SSA. We characterized Africa as having communal ownership, while the 26 When estimated on the SSA sample, the price index coefficient (s.e.) is -7.59 (3.07), significant at the 5% level. 27 We ran the "dfbeta" command in Stata to find these outliers. Table 4 and the quality and consistency of the data are more limited than Bruce (1998) , which is an in-depth study for each country on this specific question).
Another potential reason for a differential is that effects are somehow conditional on the "stage of development", an issue we will explore for modern manufacturing development. We tried the 1965 level of our education variable as a measure of overall "stage of development".
The base price shock coefficient is 9.92 and its interaction with education is -14.2. Neither is significant and the interaction coefficient is opposite in sign to expectations given that SSA countries have lower education levels. Differences in effects might alternatively be related to geography. We considered geographic variables affecting agriculture (Collier and Venables 2007) , including distance from the equator, rainfall, fraction of the country in tropical zones, and agricultural potential as modeled by Ramankutty et al (2002) . None of these variables has noticeable, let alone significant, interactions with agricultural price shocks. Below, we look at interactions with political/institutional variables. They also have no effect.
Non-food agriculture and natural resources
Our results differ from Jedwab (2012) . For two African countries, he finds growth is spurred in towns local to areas experiencing positive agricultural rent shocks. His work does not deal with overall national urbanization per se, and some local towns may or may not be defined to be in the urban sector, so his specific results are not necessarily inconsistent with ours. However the general claims differ. In this paper positive shocks to agriculture deter urbanization in Africa, while Jedwab (2012) and Gollin et al. (2012) argue the opposite. To be fair, Jedwab (2012) focuses on "resource rents", in his case rents from the production of non-food agriculture, whereas we draw on data for all agricultural exports. For comparison, we formed a category of "non-food" products (palm oil, coffee, cocoa, linseed oil, wool, tobacco, cattle hides, copra, sisal, rubber, tea and cotton). Column 4 shows results for this class. Both the SSA and non-SSA price coefficients increase in magnitude, with the same signs as in the specification including food crops, but lose significance. The results are again consistent with consumer cities in the rest of the world but not in SSA.
Finally we turn to natural resource rents from minerals, oil and gas. Collier and Venables (2007) presume increases in rents make rural populations less mobile and reduce urbanization in Africa. A different story is that rents and aid are captured by urban residents and spent in cities, increasing urbanization (Ades and Glaeser 1996; Davis and Henderson 2003) . Analogously to our strategy for agriculture, we look at exogenous price shocks to the natural resource sector.
The specific resources are listed in Appendix Table 2 ; note the absence of data for gold and diamonds. We get exactly the same SSA and non-SSA divide we had for agriculture for natural resource shocks, but in this case results are statistically insignificant. Basic results are in Table 7 columns 1-3. Column 1 shows an overall insignificant effect of natural resource price shocks on urbanization. Column 2 shows an SSA versus non-SSA divide similar to what we saw for agriculture, but in this case weaker statistically. In column 3, we remove the one observation where dfbeta > |0.5| reducing the almost the price shock and SSA interaction effects dramatically. We therefore conclude there is no strong evidence that the limited set of natural resource price shocks in our data affect urbanization either inside or outside of Africa.
Trade shocks to manufacturing
Manufactured products are highly heterogeneous within the categories reported in the trade data, so, unlike agriculture, there are not price data. Instead, we consider shocks to demand, as proxied by income shocks in high-income importer countries. The underlying assumptions are that: (1) demand for certain manufactured products is income elastic, so increased incomes generate demand shocks for manufactured exports from less developed countries, and (2) such products tend to be produced in urban rather than rural areas. While these shocks are probably less salient than price shocks, we focus on a class of goods we call modern manufactured products that: (1) may have relatively high income elasticity, and (2) are relatively more affected by urban scale economies in developing countries (Henderson et al. 2001) .
In order to focus on the income effect of these shocks, we use data on trade flows from a fixed period (1962-69) before our period of interest. We limit our sample of importers to
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) members as of 1974, excluding Turkey, which is a developing country based on our definition in this paper. These 23 countries purchase the vast majority of African exports. 28 The data, as recorded by the importer, are from the NBER trade database (Feenstra et al. 2005 ).
Our demand shocks are income growth of OECD countries applied to historical gross exports ("historical pathways") from developing country j to OECD country i . Exports of 28 The list is Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France-Monaco, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, SwitzerlandLiechtenstein, the United Kingdom and the United States. Countries linked by a hyphen in this list are treated as one in the trade data. Similarly, one region these countries import from in some years is the "South African Customs Union", which includes South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho. We apply those base numbers just to South Africa as it is by far the largest economy in the group. 29 As an alternative to applying fixed weights from the 1960s, we considered time-varying weights for the period 14-16 years before each of our sample years. This might increase the explanatory power of the proxy as it would incorporate the effects of import destinations that have become prominent since the 1960s. However, we worry about endogeneity, since other factors affecting urbanization may also affect exports, and so any results could be driven just by this rise in exports which is correlated with rising urbanization (as opposed to the OECD income shocks). Thus we rely on the results using the 1960s weights for all years.
,62 69 10 , ,62 69 (10)
The income growth shocks use unlogged changes in real GDP measured in PPP units, thereby implying bigger importing countries have a bigger impact.
We define these shocks for several commodity classes, c : (1) and rural areas. The SITC system is not well-suited for some of these categories, especially modern, so we tried some variants, with little effect on results.
Total exports (not just to OECD countries) of manufactures from our sample of developing countries increased from 2.2% to 6.8% of their aggregate GDP between 1962-69 and 1998-2000.
Interestingly, the SSA countries start more manufacturing-intensive and end less so than non-SSA countries. 30 The big growth is in the modern sector, which starts at an average of 0.22% and increases to 2.7% by 1998-2000. For modern, SSA countries start higher than non-SSA, at 0.32% versus 0.15%, but end lower at 2.5% versus 2.9%. If one removes Liberia, which reported substantial exports but a GDP reduced massively by war in 1998-2000, the ending SSA value is reduced to 0.38%, raising the regional differential considerably. All countries in our sample report some modern exports in the 1960s, so these changes are not on the extensive margin at the country level.
Of the five separate manufacturing commodity classes, modern products is the only one for which OECD income shocks have a significant positive effect on urbanization, either overall or for non-SSA or SSA countries, in all specifications of lag structures and bases. Traditional manufactures has a significant negative effect overall, which is consistent with village-based production in the rural sector. As our focus is on urbanization, the remaining results emphasize modern products, though some formulations also include all manufacturing commodity classes with the exception of modern products grouped together as a control.
We report our results in Table 8 . In column 1, the OECD income shock variable for the modern sector is positive but not significant. Column 2 shows that this result masks two sharply different regional effects. For the rest of world (NSSA), the income shock effect is positive and significant. A one standard deviation ($4.1 billion) increase in the modern shock leads to a 1 percent point increase in the change in the urban share which has a mean of 4.58 in the overall sample (4.81 in NSSA). The effect is both sharp and large. Column 2 also shows that the net effect (25.38 -23.12) for SSA countries is zero.
To consider the possibility that our results are driven by outliers, we dropped individual observations whose absence noticeably changed the coefficients of interest (the modern manufacturing income shock or the SSA differential for that variable). There are only two such observations, and our results are robust to their removal. 31 As mentioned above, our definition of modern manufacturing is not ideal. In particular, we counted SITC code 89, "Miscellaneous manufactured articles" as modern, and it is a substantial category for some countries. As a robustness check, we removed some sub-categories that are obviously not modern such as works of art, collectors' pieces and antiques (896), basketwork (8997) and small wares and toilet articles (8998) with essentially no effect on results. In column 3, we control for shocks to all other (i.e. non-modern) manufacturing sectors. It has a negative coefficient with an enhanced negative effect for SSA countries, but those effects are not significant. There is no impact of the added controls on the modern sector results.
Why do modern sector trade shocks not spur urbanization in Africa, while they do in the rest of the world as expected? To answer this, we considered whether many African countries with low levels of human capital lack the capacity (in terms of labor force quality and institutions) to respond to trade shocks to the modern sector. We use mean years of high school and college in the adult population in 1965 as a pre-determined control for capacity. As noted earlier (see Table   1 ), African countries have much lower education levels on average, but there is an overlap in the 31 We used the dfbeta command in Stata with the same 0.35 criterion used with the price shock data. Two observations are dropped, and the coefficient on the basic modern manufacturing shock variable increases in absolute magnitude to 4.37, with SSA countries still having a net zero effect.
distributions. The top quartile of SSA countries is above the bottom quartile of NSSA countries.
In column 4, the base coefficient on the modern sector shock is insignificant and negative, but with the education variable yields almost identical coefficients on the shock variables. We tried a horse race for column 4 to see if we interacted everything with SSA whether the education variable worked the same in both regions. This is too much for the data: none of the relevant coefficients are significant at the 5% level and only one at the 10% level (SSA interacted with education X the shock variable). The point estimates of the shock effects are generally positive for most non-SSA country education values and for a number of SSA county values as well. 32 In column 5, we allow 2 years for shocks to take effect rather than 5, but the results are essentially the same.
Institutions
In this section, we examine the role of general political and institutional development on urbanization. While weak institutions are widely believed to inhibit development, we ask whether they have any further effect on urbanization, conditional on the degree of development.
One hypothesis in this regard is that countries with weak underlying determinants of institutions may find it harder to upgrade from the informal institutions that tend to prevail in rural societies to the more formal, and structured, institutions that are characteristic of urban settings. As such, these countries may be less likely to urbanize. This question is difficult to study empirically, because urbanization may also affect the quality of institutions. Key governmental institutions are located in cities and employ urban residents. Governments may look increasingly to urban residents for political support as urbanization increases.
We address this question initially by using the well-known polity2 and related measures that attempt to capture the degree of democratization and authoritarianism and quality of institutions 32 The coefficients on the base shock, that shock interacted with SSA, the base shock interacted with education, and that interaction interacted with SSA are respectively 0.00021, -0.00024, -0.000187, and 0.00033.
as they evolve over time. In an effort to mitigate the endogeneity, we use level measures from 15 years ago relative to the present, and also experimented with 10-year changes with a 10-year lag (i.e. change in the decade prior to the current decade's urbanization change). However the issue of endogeneity remains critical.
Thus, we also focus on two measures of long pre-determined historical circumstances that are likely to shape current institutions. First, ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) from the early 1960s, used by Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (2011) , and others, represents the probability that two independently drawn random residents of a country are from the same ethnolinguistic group. It captures potential for within-country conflict that may slow democratization, as well as a force that may reduce the strength of a central government. Second, the length of ancient statehood (Putterman 2007; see also Bockstette et al. 2002 , Alesina et al. 2011 ) is an index of the geographic and (discounted) temporal extent of domestic governance beyond the tribal level from 1 to 1950 C.E. This is intended to capture the potential for a stronger central government and development of solid institutions.
We enter each of these measures in separate urbanization regressions, but report all four coefficients in column 1 of Table 9 . The polity measure is completely insignificant, both on its own and interacted with SSA (not shown). 33 ELF is stronger but also insignificant. Years of ancient statehood increases urbanization, and the effect is significant at almost the 5% level. There is also the notion that institutions may mediate the other effects we have found for agricultural price shocks, and, in particular, that they might explain the SSA dummy. We interacted all of our measures of institutions with agricultural price shocks. No interaction terms are ever significant at a reasonable level. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 we present a sample of these results, for years of ancient statehood and polity2 levels. Although the signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with the hypothesis that better institutions act to make the effect of agricultural price shocks on urbanization positive, the effects are completely insignificant.
Conclusions
Does urbanization in Africa differ from the rest of the world? When, instead of income, urbanization is matched to effective technology, as proxied by educational attainment, the African experience matches global patterns. At a sector level, while positive trade shocks to modern manufacturing promote urbanization in the rest of the developing world, this effect is absent in Africa. We suggest that this may be explained by differences in level of development,
where the capacity at low levels of development to respond to modern manufacturing sector shocks may be limited. Our starkest results relate to agricultural price shocks. Thus, whilst recent literature has argued that Africa exhibits an unanticipated positive impact of agricultural shocks on urbanization, we find the opposite: urbanization in Africa responds negatively to trade price shocks, just as we would expect from a simple theoretical model. On the contrary, it is the rest of the developing world where we find a perverse response of urbanization to agricultural trade shocks. In short, to the extent urbanization does differ in Africa, it does not differ in the ways the literature postulates.
Appendix 1: Data

Definition of samples
Our sample consists of all countries that satisfied two criteria in 1970: (i) a population in excess of 300,000; and (ii) a level of GDP per capita that was less than the world sample mean for all countries that satisfied (i). Only countries that have data on both urban share and GDP per capita in 1970 and 2009 or 2010 are included in the sample. Other variables have some missing values within this sample. As discussed in the main text, we also experimented with a narrower sample restricted to countries with a 1970 GDP per capita level that was less than 50 % of the world sample mean (again with the mean defined for all countries with a population in excess of 300,000). Table A1 provides a full list of all countries in our sample. Countries in bold are not included in the more restrictive sample.
Definition of variables and data sources
Population and urban share
Estimates 
Effective technology
Average years of high school (secondary) and college-level (tertiary) education in the adult population aged 25 and over is used as a proxy for effective technology. Data are from the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset, 2011 version (http://www.barrolee.com/). We also experimented with an alternative measure of effective technology -the fraction of the population aged 25 and over with at least some high schooling, from the same source. The share of the female population aged 15 and over with at least completed primary school, used as an instrument in section 3.2 of the main text, is also from the same source.
Democratization
Democratization is measured using the revised combined polity score (POLITY2) taken from the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2010;  http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). POLITY2 is measured on a -10 to +10 scale where -10 represents a strongly autocratic political regime and +10 a strongly autocratic political regime. 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index
The ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index was taken from the replication data for Alesina et al (2011) , who describe it as follows:
"The literature of ethnolinguistic fractionalization has normally focused on one index of fractionalization, the Herfindhal index, which captures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the population of the country belong to different groups. The original index was based on a linguistic classification of groups from a Soviet source (the Atlas Narodov Mira, Bruk and Apenchenko 1964)."
State Antiquity Index
The State Antiquity Index ("Statehist") Version 3.1 was taken from the replication data for Alesina et al (2011) . It is described further below by Louis Putterman as follows Answers were extracted from the historical accounts on each of 119 countries in the Encyclopedia Britannica. The scores on the three questions were multiplied by one another and by 50, so that for a given fifty year period, what is today a country has a score of 50 if it was an autonomous nation, 0 if it had no government above the tribal level, 25 if the entire territory was ruled by another country, and so on. To combine the data of the 39 periods, Bockstette et al.
tried alternative rates for discounting the influence of the past, ranging from 0 to a discount of 36 Note that while this paragraph refers to an earlier version of the dataset, the same document goes on characterize all subsequent edits as additions of new countries using the same methods.
50% for each half century. At a 50% discount rate, for example, the contribution to our index of having had an autonomous state over the whole territory from 1850 to 1900 is 50x(1.5) -1 = 33.33.
The bulk of the analysis in the paper used statehist05, which has a discount rate of 5% (i.e., 0.05). Finally in order to make the series easier to interpret, the sum of the discounted series was divided by the maximum possible value the series could take given the same discount rate. Thus the value that the index could take for any given country lay between zero and one."
Land ownership
Land ownership data by country come from the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD;
http://www.afd.fr/lang/en/home/recherche/bases-ipd) produced by the French Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employment (MINEIE) and the French Development Agency (AFD) based on surveys of French government officials working in countries around the world.
Rainfall
The rainfall data are in millimeters per year and are aggregated from Matsuura and Wilmott's (2012) 0.5 X 0.5 degree grid (approximately 3000 square km at the equator) to countries using the country grid of Mitchell et al (2002) .
Price and income shock data
The price shock indices draw data from several sources. Exports by commodity for 1962 -1969 and 1970 -1972 are from Feenstra et al (2005 . Price data for the 37 commodities listed in table A2 are from World Bank (2012) and UNCTAD (2012). We define all products that are grown, except for logs and sawnwood, as agricultural, and the remainder as (non-agricultural) natural resources. These commodities are a subset of those with world prices listed in these two sources.
In order to be included in the present study they had to 1) have uninterrupted price series from either source between 1960 and 2010, 2) correspond to an export category in the Feenstra database in a form embodying little or no processing. CPI is from the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics. GDP in current dollars (the units of the exports data) at PPP for 1962-1972 is from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011) , except for 6 countries 37 with missing 1960s data. For these, log GDP was predicted based on annual cross-sectional linear regressions of log GDP at PPP from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011) on log GDP in current dollars from the World Development Indicators, log of total population and the urban population share.
37 Afghanistan, Cambodia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Swaziland.
The income shocks use the Feenstra et al. (2005) , with product categories defined in the text. As represented in Feenstra (2005) , the OECD countries are Australia, Austria, BelgiumLuxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France-Monaco, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, SwitzerlandLiechtenstein, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Sector shares and land area
Data on the shares of agriculture, manufacturing and services value added in GDP, as well as land area, are from the World Development Indicators 2011 (http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2011).
Appendix 2: Model
Growth properties of the model
To see some properties of a growth process we consider two simple growth formulations with exogenous savings, avoiding the even more complicated endogenous growth details as developed in Henderson and Wang (2005) . We use the specific functional forms footnoted in the text. We assume all goods are traded internationally at fixed prices, that human capital is converted at the numeraire, and that population grows at an exogenous rate /
For the simplest case, suppose s fraction of income is saved by all people and that Once we allow human capital to differ across sectors these issues do not go away.
However it is helpful to examine the case briefly to establish relative urban-rural differences in human capital allocations. Families each have the same human capital h which they rent in capital markets. The return to capital r must be equalized in uses so that
Incomes net of capital rental costs must be equalized across sectors so that 
